THE RATIONALE OF RATIFICATION*
'By PHILIP MECHEM t
INTRODUCTION

Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur.
Every ratification is dragged back and treated as equivalent to a prior
authority.
The doctrine expressed by this ponderous maxim is well-settled
in Agency law.' The subject, however, is a difficult and puzzling one.
Just as in the case of undisclosed principal, recourse is often had to the
adjective "anomalous." In the one case it is asked: how can you contract with some one you never heard of ? In the other: how can a contract, admittedly not binding on the principal when made, become so
at a later time by his mere assent, without new consideration, without
the assent of the third party (as distinguished from his dissent) and
indeed often without his knowledge? 2
One answer that might be given is that, just as in the case of undisclosed principal, the doctrine is more anomalous in theory than in practice. The issue of the agent's authority will not be settled until the
matter is litigated, at a time substantially subsequent to the making of
the contract; as a practical matter does it then make much difference
when the principal expressed his willingness to be bound, as long as it
is retroactively clear that at some time he has expressed it? The third
party proceeded on the assumption that the contract bound the principal
(as did the agent to the extent that his behaviour might be involved);
the principal's assent, though subsequent, now merely makes it clear
that the transaction is to be treated as what it appeared to be all along.
Such a consequence is, if anything, less anomalous than the contrary
one would be.
It is believed, however, that a more basic answer can be given.
The difficulties and anomalies of the subject, it is suggested, arise chiefly
* This article is drawn from the chapters on Ratification of Professor Mechem's
MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCy, to be published this spring
by Calaghan & Company.
t- Professor of Law,. University of Pennsylvania. Editor of MECHEM, CASES
ON AGENCY (3d ed.); co-editor of MECHEM & ATYINSON, CASES ON Wn.LS AND
AnnNIsTmAT0io
(3d ed.). Author of articles in various legal publications.
1. In Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891), Holmes, J.,
in a learned opinion traces the history of the doctrine from the Roman law and attributes the modem form of the Latin maxim to Lord Coke.
2. "As a general rule, only persons who are parties to a contract, acting either
by themselves or by an authorized agent, can sue or be sued on the contract. A
stranger can not enforce the contract, nor can it be enforced against a stranger. That
is the rule but there are exceptions. The most remarkable exception, I think, results
from the doctrine of ratification as established in English law." Lord Macnaghten
in Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, [1901] App. Cas. 240.
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from the difference between terminology and practice. The maxim,
supra, and the various "requirements" of ratification as given in the
books, sound largely in terms of a principal who wishes in cold blood
to become bound on a contract made in his name but by a purported
agent who lacked authority to bind the purported principal, at least in
the way in question.
This is quite unrealistic and, so, misleading. Not one case in a
hundred deals with such a situation. Discussion of the law applicable
to it is largely academic. Rarely indeed is the principal trying to ratify;
he is trying to escape from ratification.
A realistic statement of the problem that goes under the name
of ratification might be this: what are the acts and facts by which a
purported principal may be precluded from denying that the agent who
purported to bind him had no authority to do so? As the statement
suggests, estoppel, at least in the broad sense, is often involved. So is
mistake. So is election; so is unjust enrichment. These are familiar
topics and in no sense anomalous. Once the matter is put, for example,
in terms of the proposition that ordinary principles of equity preclude
a principal from retaining the consideration given in reliance on his
promised performance and at the same time refusing to give the promised performance on the ground that the promise was unauthorized-all
mystery, all anomaly disappear from the situation. (And, it might be
added, it is only where the attempt is made to handle matters solely by
the application of the maxim as a rule of law that the result is likely
to be anomalous. 2 a)
The Conventional Requirements and Limitations.-First,a brief
statement will be made of some of the more familiar requirements and
limitations as found in the books. As suggested above, they tend to
sound in terms of an intentional and willing affirmance; later discussion
will deal with the matter from a somewhat different angle and it may
then be considered how realistic these propositions are.
(a) Present Capacity of P.-It is scarcely more than a truism to
say that the principal must be legally competent at the time of ratification. Ratification is a jural act, having consequences as important as
those of making a contract, and as much capacity is plainly necessary
to ratify a contract as would have been necessary to authorize it in the
first place.8
2a. Conspicuously so, for example, as in the cases discussed, infra, in which there
is said to be ratification of a tort.
3. See Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124 (1877). That the ratification must be of
equal dignity with the required prior authorization, see Stetson v. Patten, 2 Greenleaf 358 (1823, Me.); Halland v. Johson, 42 N.D. 360, 174 N.W. 874 (1919);
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(b) Original Validity of the Contract; Supervening Illegality.Since the doctrine of ratification causes the transaction to be treated
as if there had been authority in the first place, it follows (in logic, at
least) that if the transaction would have been initially invalid, though
authorized, ratification cannot subsequently make it valid. Since an
unborn person can scarcely contract, it must follow that a contract purporting to bind a principal not yet born could not be ratified. (From a
practical standpoint, it is not inconceivable that in such a case the principal when born might act in such a way as to be subject to liability.)
The same would be true of a contract purporting to bind one then totally
without contractual capacity but later acquiring it. A very common
instance of this is a contract made by promoters on behalf of an as yet
non-existent corporation. Since by conventional dogma ratification is
impossible, courts have been forced to exercise great ingenuity to find
formulae permitting the corporation to be held when formed. Considerations of space forbid more than mentioning this problem here;
reference must be made to authorities on corporation law.4 The contract likewise must have been a legal one when made.5
More difficult is the question whether a contract may be ratified
which was legal when made but illegal at the time of the attempted
ratification. Here perhaps the criterion is the effect of ratification. If
it would be to bind the parties to a performance now illegal, plainly
there can be no ratification. If, on the other hand the result is simply
to enforce obligations resulting from an agreement legal when made,
the ratification may operate. The Restatement I illustrates this by saying that a contract to sell and deliver liquor, legal when made, but illegal
at the time of the attempted ratification, plainly could not be ratified.
On the other hand if the liquor had been delivered (and perhaps consumed) at a time when such was legal, but payment for it had not been
made, a ratification whereby the seller became entitled to payment would
not be objectionable, since thereby the seller simply becomes entitled to
payment for services which were legal when rendered, and does not
attempt to enforce an act in violation of public policy.
Allegheny Gas Co. v. Kemp, 316 Pa. 97, 174 AtI. 289 (1934); Dunbar v. Farnum,
109 Vt. 313, 196 AtI. 237 (1937); Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 289 Ky. 159, 158 S.W.2d 437 (1942); Wyman v. Utech,

256 Wis. 234, 42 N.W._d 603 (1950).

4. Many cases on the problem are collected in 123 A.L.R. 726.
5. See Zottman v. City and County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96 (1862) ; Sanford v. Johnson, 24 Minn. 172 (1877); Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 171
AUt. 149, aff'd, 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 AtI. 507 (1934); Sullivan v. Hardin, 102 S.W.2d
1110 (1937); Board of Education v. Baugh, 240 Ala. 391, 199 So. 822 (1941);
Gilkison v. Roberts, 154 Kans. 52, 114 P.2d 797 (1941).
6. REsTATEmENT, AGENCY § 86.
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(c) Undisclosed and Partially Disclosed P.-A second proposition scarcely more than a truism is that a contract ostensibly and
actually made by a person solely on his own behalf, cannot be appropriated by another by "ratifying" it. There is nothing to ratify; it
would be mere larceny of another's contract.
More difficult is the question how far the contract must go in disclosing and identifying the principal. Is it enough that a party ostensibly binding himself and himself only, privately intends to contract on
behalf of a principal? Must it be a principal or a particular principal?
May he simply be described in such a way as to permit identification or
must he be named?
A substantial majority of the cases has refused to permit ratification where the contract as made in no way purports to bind a principal,
although the agent privately intends to do so.7 The law of undisclosed
principal, it is said, is an anomaly; to permit him to ratify would be
to add one anomaly to another.' Furthermore, it is said in the same
case, practical considerations forbid a rule which would require ascertaining the intent of the contractor at the time the contract is made.
7. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Minnesota Fire Ass'n., 48 Minn. 278, 51 N.W. 608
(1892); Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, [1901] A.C. 240, noted in 15 HRv.
L. REv. 221 (1901); Ferris v. Snow, 130 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 850 (1902); Knapp
v. Baldwin, 213 Iowa 24, 238 N.W. 542 (1931); Fay v. Doyle, 68 App.D.C. 199,
95 F.2d 110 (1938); Valaske v. Wirtz, 106 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1939); Pullen v.
Dale, 109 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1940); Hirzel Funeral Homes v. Equitable Trust
Co., 83 A.2d 700 (Del. 1951). But it seems there can be ratification where the
agent purports to be acting on the principal's behalf but is secretly acting on his
own behalf: In re Tiedemann and Freres, 2 Q.B. § 66 (1889).
8. In Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, supra note 7, Roberts bought wheat
from plaintiff, intending to buy as defendants' agent, but without authority and without disclosing his intent. Defendants ratified but later refused to take the wheat.
Judgment for defendant. Lord Davy said: "The argument seems to be that as the
law permits an undisclosed principal, on whose behalf a contract has been made to
sue and be sued on the contract, and as the effect of ratification is equivalent to a
previous mandate, a person who ratifies a contract intended but not expressed to be
made on his behalf is in the same position as any other undisclosed principal.
Further, it is said that whether the intention of the contractor be expressed or not,
its existence is mere matter of evidence, and once it is proved the conclusion ought
to follow. Romer, L. J. held that on principle it ought to be held that ratification
(in the case before the court) is possible, and that to-hold the contrary would be
to establish an anomaly in the law, and moreover a useless one. My Lords, I cannot
agree. There is a wide difference between an agency existing at the date of the
contract which is susceptible of proof, and a repudiation of which by the agent
would be fraudulent, and an intention locked up in the mind of the contractor, which
he may either abandon or act on at his own pleasure, and the ascertainment of which
involves an inquiry into the state of his mind at the date of the contract. Where
the intention to contract on behalf of another is expressed in the contract, it passes
from the region of speculation into that of fact, and becomes irrevocable. In what
sense, it may be asked, does a man contract for another when it depends on his own
will whether he will give that other the benefit of the contract or not? In the next
place, the rule which permits an undisclosed principal to sue and be sued on a contract to which he is not a party, though well settled, is itself an anomaly, and to
extend it to case of a person who accepts the benefit of an undisclosed intention of
a party to the contract would, in my opinion, be adding another anomaly to the law,
and not correcting an anomaly."
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A few jurisdictions have taken the contrary view, usually without
discussion of the point.9 It is to be noted that in a number of these
cases the "ratification" found was based on the retention by P of benefits
received by him under the unauthorized contract. In such cases, where
P obviously must either restore the benefit received or keep it on the
terms on which it is given, it seems not very material that in the original
transaction no mention of a principal was made. Doubtless this is
another of the "requirements" which presupposes an intentional ratification and makes little sense where the question is whether P has put
himself in such a position as to equitably preclude him from disaffirming
the contract.
(d) P's Knowledge of MaterialFacts.-Oneof the most common
cliches of the subject is that there can be no ratification unless at the
time of the ratification the purported principal had full knowledge of all
the pertinent facts. This, if true, is curious. The doctrines of fraud
and mistake give protection, but within rather narrow limits, to one
who makes a contract or, in fact, to one who authorizes the making of
one on his behalf. For the most part if he acts without knowledge of,
or under mistaken assumptions as to, material facts, he does so at his
own risk. Is the case really different with one who ratifies?
The Restatement states: 10 "In other consensual transactions, lack
of knowledge by both parties as to the essential facts upon which the
transaction is based constitutes a ground for rescission, but where
manifestations of consent have been exchanged creating a contract,
ordinarily the mistake of one of the parties not induced by a misrepresentation of the other is not a ground for rescission. A contract which
results from ratification, however, may be rescinded by the person
affirming, if he affirms under a unilateral mistake as to a material fact,
unless he assumes the risk of mistake, or unless the third person has
changed his position in reliance upon the ratification."
The comment quoted gives no reason for this distinction, although
it would seem that some reason is needed. It is believed that the common statement, and this expansion of it in the Restatement is, if not
erroneous, at least misleading. There appears to be only one type of
situation where mistake does have the effect attributed; in the situations
to which the statement would most naturally appear to be applicable,
it appears not to be true. Two situations need to be considered.
9. See Hayward v. Langmaid, 181 Mass. 426, 63 N.E. 912 (1902) (with which
cf. Allen v. Liston Lumber Co., 281 Mass. 440, 183 N.E. 747 (1933)); Speer v.
Campbell, 167 Wash. 544, 9 P.2d 1100 (1932). Cases are collected in 124 A.L.R.
893.
10. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 91, Comment b.
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(i) Mistake as to Basic Inducing Fact.-First, suppose that P
ratifies a contract, under some misapprehension as to factors affecting
the wisdom of doing so, although not under such misapprehension as
would justify a rescission for mistake if he were making rather than
ratifying the contract. Is the ratification inoperative?
It would seem that this is the precise situation suggested by the
customary statement, and by the language of the Restatement. It is
believed however, that this ratification neither should nor would be
invalidated for P's failure to have knowledge of the material facts. No
case so holding has been found. Such small authority as deals with the
problem points in the opposite direction. Thus, in a well-known Pennsylvania case," P's agent in this country without authority advanced
P's money to a mutual friend, to enable her to save stock that she was
carrying on a margin account. P, in Europe, on being informed of A's
action, expressly approved. Later, however, he attempted to disavow
the ratification on the ground that he had not realized in what a critical
condition the friend's account was. The court denied this contention
saying it was well settled that a principal could ratify without knowledge
of material facts "if he intentionally and deliberately does so, knowing
that he does not possess such knowledge and does not make further
inquiry into the matter." This "exception" to the ordinary rule is often
repeated; it would seem to cover nearly all cases where the facts would
2
not warrant rescission for mistake.1
(ii) Ignorance of Unauthoriaed Term in a Contract Otherwise
Authorized.-The second situation to be considered, and the only one
where any substantial number of cases can be found, purporting to apply
the quoted rule, is that where P has approved a contract made for him
but in ignorance of the fact that it contains an unauthorized provision.
Thus, where a landlord approved a lease made on his behalf by his son,
not knowing that the son had promised to make certain repairs, it was
held that the landlord was not bound by the agreement to make repairs. 3
So in a North Carolina case, P approved a sale of a note made for
him by A, on the assumption (semble) that it was transferred without
recourse; on learning that A had indorsed it in P's name, P was held
not bound by ratification.' 4 In a number of such cases, P is held to
11. Currie v. Land title Bank & Trust Co., 333 Pa. 310, 5 A2d 168 (1939).
12. See Haines v. Rumpb, 147 Ark. 425, 228 S.W. 46 (1921); Hill v. Tillman
Co. Bank, 117 Okla. 210, 245 Pac. 628 (1926) ; Miller v. Chatsworth Savings Bank,
203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722 (1927).
13. Lusco v. Jackson, 27 Ala. App. 531, 175 So. 566 (1937).
14. Sherrill v. Weisiger 114 N.C. 438, 19 S.E. 365 (1894). See Combs v. Scott,
12 Allen 493 (Mass. 1866); Valley Bank of Phoenix v. Brown, 9 Ariz. 311, 83

Pac. 362 (1905); Thompson v. Laboringman's Mercantile and Manufacturing Co.,
60 W.Va. 42, 53 S.E. 908 (1906); Simonin's Sons, Inc. v. American Credit In-
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have ratified because of his carelessness in failing to avail himself of
readily accessible information. 15
These cases, it is thought, do not require justification by any
doctrine peculiar to ratification. They appear to be natural applications
of fundamental contract law. Is there a "meeting of minds?" The
part played by the agent makes it difficttlt to find an exact contractual
analogue; is it too far-fetched to consider the case of the two good ships
Peerless as in point? It seems reasonable to say that the supposed
contract (in the ratification case) is made by the concurrence of the
consent of the third party to the contract as proposed to him by the
agent and the consent of the principal, as expressed by his ratification,
to the contract as then presented to him. Plainly there has been no real
consensus ad idem nor any apparent one. However the principal
ratifies, it is not necessary to treat him as saying: "I ratify the proposition as made to T." He says: "I ratify the contract as I reasonably
suppose it to be, in the light of my authorization and of the information
given me by my agent." Since in all such cases the agent will normally
have acted misleadingly if not fraudulently, it may be not inappropriate
to compare them to a famous Massachusetts illustration of the "Peerless" doctrine, namely the bathhouse case, Vickery v. Ritchie 16 where
the architect fraudulently gave the contracting parties two different
estimates, each naming a different price, on the basis of which the
parties purported to contract. Obviously no contract was made; the
court so held.
If these cases are in point, there appears to be no deviation from
fundamental contract principles in holding that the P is not bound to
the unknown term by his ratification.
demnity Co., 318 Pa. 160, 177 Aft. 807 (1935); Barclay v. Dublin Lake Club, 89
N.H. 500, 1 A.2d 633 (1938); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n.
v. Peny, 41 Cal.App.2d 133, 106 P.2d 53 (1940); Broer v. Fenton's Vigortone Co.,

231 Iowa 1276, 4 N.W.2d 416 (1942).

In some of these cases there were actual misrepresentations sufficient to invalidate
an ordinary transaction.
"The argument that knowledge of Lyman was that of his principal, begs the question. It assumes his authority to act in the matter. 'The knowledge of an agent
is the knowledge of his principal in regard to such matters only as come within the
scope of the agent's employment.' Bohanan v. Railroad, 70 N.H. 526, 529. To the
same effect, see Castonguay v. Company, 83 N.H. 1; Warren v. Hayes, 74 N.H.
355. The liability of an alleged principal cannot be enlarged by proof that his agent

to do one act knew that he had done another act which was not authorized." Edelstone v. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co., 84 N.H. 315, 150 Atl. 545 (1930). Cf. Hyatt v.

Clark, 118 N.Y. 563, 23 N.E. 891 (1890) and comment thereon in Corbin, Ratification in Agency Without Kiiowledge of Material Facts, 15 YAI LJ. 331, 338

(1906).

15. See Holloway v. Arkansas City Milling Co., 77 Kans. 76, 93 Pac. 577
(1908); Payne Realty Co. v. Lindsey, 91 W.Va. 127, 112 S.E. 306 (1922); Hamil-

ton v. Shredded Wheat Sales, 54 RI. 285, 172 Atl. 614 (1934) ; Gordon v. Pettingill,
105 Colo. 214, 96 P.2d 416 (1939).
16. 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909).
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If the failure to achieve a meeting of minds prevents the formation
of any contract and so relieves P of an obligation to perform with the
unauthorized term included, does it not follow that T is likewise relieved
of any obligation to perform with the unauthorized term excluded?
Normally the answer would seem to be clear: yes. In a few instances,
particularly where there has been part performance and change of
position, equitable considerations may justify the principal in standing
on the authorized contract and repudiating the unauthorized part. Such
7
cases will be considered later.1
Ratification of Tort.-May a person become a servant, or may
the act of a servant not in the course of employment, become so, so
as to charge a master, by a subsequent ratification on the part of the
purported master? Such a proposition seems more anomalous than
ratification by a principal, but the relatively few cases 18 are in agreement that there may be a ratification, as long as a supporting nexus is
established by showing that the tortfeasor was intending to act for the
20
purported master.'" The leading case is Dempsey v. Chambers
where, under circumstances not stated, one not in fact defendant's
servant, was delivering, without his knowledge or consent, a load of
coal plaintiff had ordered from defendant. In so doing he negligently
broke plaintiff's window. With knowledge of these facts, defendant
presented to plaintiff a bill for the coal and was paid. It was held
(semble because of the demand for payment, though this is nowhere
explicitly stated) that defendant had ratified the stranger's act, and
Holmes, J. said that "consistency with the whole course of authority
requires us to hold that the defendant's ratification of the employment
established the relation of master and servant from the beginning, with
all its incidents, including the anomalous liability for his negligent acts."
Perhaps such a case can be justified by saying that coal delivering
was defendant's business, that the law of respondeat superior makes
him bear the cost of negligent delivery, and that there was no evidence
to suggest that the interloper was more likely to be negligent than one
of defendant's regular servants. On the other hand there seems to be
no great inherent equity in the result. If one buys a horse with a war17. See Note 41, infra and text.
18. See Forbes v. Hagman, 75 Va. 168 (1881) ; Brown v. City of Webster City,
115 Iowa 511, 88 N.W. 1070 (1902); Keedy v. Amherst, 222 Mass. 72, 109 N.E.
817 (1915); Kirk v. Montana Transfer Co., 56 Mont. 292, 184 Pac. 987 (1919);
Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 Atl. 645 (1922) ; Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co.,
81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932).
19. See Matulis v. Gans, 107 Conn. 562, 141 At. 871 (1928) ; Ernshaw v.
Roberge, 86 N.H. 451, 170 AtI. 7 (1934); Bryan v. Pommert, 37 N.E. 720 (Ind.
App. 1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 85.

20. 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279 (1891).
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ranty from an agent, it is unfair for the principal to keep the price and
repudiate the warranty since that was part of the consideration for
the price. It is less plausible to say that the price of the coal was in
part paid on the understanding that defendant would be responsible for
its careful delivery; non constat that plaintiff could have complained
had defendant had the coal delivered by an independent contractor. 2 '
If the result of the Chambers case appears anomalous, what is to
be said of the cases 22 holding a servant's assault ratified by the master's
subsequent approval of it by his retention of the servant in his employ?
In a recent Federal case from Alaska ' defendant's barkeeper violently
assaulted T, obviously from motives strictly personal. On encountering T subsequently defendant said to him: "If I had been there, I would
have broke your God damn neck." From this statement and the fact
that defendant did not discharge the barkeeper, the jury were allowed
to find that he had ratified the assault.
What considerations of justice or policy justify such a decision, is
hard to say. The result seems purely punitive. Defendant is punished
21. An interesting and perplexing question that suggests itself in connection with
such a case as Dempsey v. Chambers is this: what is the effect of the ratification
on the relation between M & Sf No doubt P can no longer treat the taking of the

wagon as a conversion. However, if S had been originally M's servant, he would now
be liable to indemnify M. Has M by ratifying both obligated himself to pay for the
broken window, and lost his right of indemnity? Is there any reason why he should?
S was originally liable to T; he does not appear to be prejudiced if M, having paid
T, is subrogated to T's rights against S. Or it might be suggested that S's intent
to act as M's servant, which is a pre-requisite to ratification, carries with it an
assumption of the liabilities of the position. The case is not such a one as Holloway v. Arkansas City Milling Co., 77 Kans. 76, 93 Pac. 577 (1908), where P's
so-called ratification merely means that by his careless dealing with A, P has precluded himself from complaining against A of A's violation of instructions.
It must be admitted that the writer has found no authority to support the
position suggested. And §§ 416 and 430 of the Restatement appear to be inconsistent with it.
22. See Gantt v. Belk-Simpson Co., 172 S.C. 353, 174 S.E. 1 (1934); Tanscher
v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936); State v. Shain, 345
Mo. 543, 134 S.W.2d 58 (1939); Jameson v. Gavett, 22 Cal.App.2d 646, 71 P.2d 937
(1937) ; McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249, 171 P.2d 85 (1946) ; Novick v.
Gouldsberry, 173 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1949); Gindin v. Baron, 11 N.J. Super. 215,
78 A.2d 297, aff'd, 83 A.2d 790 (N.J. Super. 1951).
In a number of the above-cited cases, it is said that punitive damages may be
recovered against the master.
Cf. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Kirkbride, 79 Tex. 457, 15 S.W. 495 (1891), where
it is said: "We think it would be extending the doctrine of ratification too far to
apply it to such a case as the one before us. Notwithstanding his one fault, the
servant may be a useful and deserving one, and worthy of promotion and encouragement. We do not think it either just to the individual, necessary' for the general good,
or a wise public policy, to so arbitrarily punish the master for lenity to a servant,
otherwise deserving, and perhaps penitent. The rule invoked might lead to the discharge of an innocent and useful servant, when wrongfully accused or suspected,
because his employer might ascertain in advance what would be the result of a future
trial, and, instead of taking the risk of being charged with a pecuniary liability
for which he was not otherise liable, might discharge the servant."
And see Judge Burch's masterful opinion in Kastrup v. Yellow Cab & Baggage
Co., 129 Kans. 329, 282 Pac. 742 (1929).
23. Novick v. Gouldsberry, 173 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1949).
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for being a bad man and glorying in his servant's viciousness rather
than condemning it and discharging the servant. Perhaps the most
charitable thing that can be suggested is that the court is using ratification where they think the master should pay but where they find it
difficult to put the assault in the course of employment.2 4 Courts sometimes bolster a dubious case by a dubious holding that the master was
at fault in hiring a servant whose bad qualities he knew or should have
known. Here it may be that the master will be deterred from congratulating and retaining his vicious servant.
No doubt these tort cases are in a sense unimportant since they
are infrequent and usually involve small amounts. However, they seem
to the writer to be doctrinally significant as tending to substantiate
the basic thesis of this essay. The contract cases normally make good
sense because normally they rest ultimately on solid principles of fair
dealing and good sense; it is of little moment that they can be rationalized, after the fact, in terms of the mouth-filling maxim omnis
ratihabitioand so on. The tort cases, on the other hand, mostly make
no sense, and it is precisely because they rest on nothing but the maxim.
VOLUNTARY RATIFICATION

It has already been suggested that in the great majority of instances ratification is simply the name given to the consequence when
in some way the purported P has precluded himself from repudiating
the transaction done by the purported agent. Such a ratification may
be treated as involuntary, since it rests not on the principal's wish to
be bound but on some other doctrine such as estoppel, unjust enrichment or the like. There are, however, some instances in which ratification can be based either on the expressed approval of the principal or
something that can be treated as equivalent. 25 Ratification by silence
24. A logical dilemma may be involved here. According to § 85 of the Restatement, and the cases that have considered the point, there can only be ratification

if the wrongdoer "intends or purports to perform [the act] as the servant" of the
one ratifying. (See note 19 supra.) In such a case modern authorities have little
difficulty in considering the act as within the course of employment.
25. See Federal Garage v. Prenner, 106 Vt. 222, 172 Atl. 622 (1934); Evans
v. Ruth, 129 Pa. Super. 192, 195 Atl. 163 (1937); Henry W. Savage, Inc. v.
Friedberg, 322 Mass. 321, 77 N.E.2d 213 (1948). And see the cases discussed,
infra note 63 and text following, dealing with the principal's attempt to ratify
where the third party wishes to repudiate the contract.
To whom must expression of assent be made? The cases are few which deal
with this problem. Logic seems to suggest that neither the agent nor the third party
need be notified, and that the essence of the act is simply some unequivocal expression of intent to be bound. See Bayley v. Bryant, 24 Pick. 198 (Mass. 1839);
Rutland v. Burlington Ry. Co., 29 Vt. 206 (1857) ; Sheffield v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 346,
10 Am. Rep. 145 (1871); Shinn v. Smiley, 1 N.J. Misc. 459, 122 Atl. 531 (1922) ;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 95. It is equally clear that notification of the agent or
third party would be the most unequivocal form of ratification, and that statements
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is generally considered to be such an equivalent, and this is a topic that
calls for some comment.
Ratification by Silence.-Suppose that P discovers that A, without
authority, has purported to act, or is purporting to act, on his behalf;
P does nothing. Does his silence amount to ratification? 28
In DiLorenzo v. Atlantic National Bank,17 plaintiff turned over
to one Del Buono, as he had before, certain bank books in which Del
Buono was to have the interest added. Del Buono, by forging the
plaintiff's name, sold the books to defendant bank which bought them
in good faith and proceeded to collect the amounts due. A few months
later, plaintiff discovered what had happened. Thereafter, for four or
five years, plaintiff negotiated with Del Buono, trying to get the money
repaid, but never notified, nor made any demand on, the defendant. He
now sues for conversion of the books. The case was tried to the court
without a jury and the court found for defendant. This was affirmed,
the court pointing out that there was no evidence of injury sustained
by defendants by reason of plaintiff's delay, and so no basis for an
estoppel, but saying that on the evidence the court below could reasonably have found that plaintiff had "assented" to the wrongful act
of his agent.
Did plaintiff "assent" ? Perhaps not, if all he did was procrastinate
through shiftlessness and stupidity. More likely, he was unwilling to
have his agent and friend prosecuted for forgery. Had plaintiff been
asked by the bank: are you going to press your claim against us or
are you going to be content with trying to get the money back from
Del Buono, and had he answered: "The latter" there could be little
doubt of its being a ratification; perhaps what happened could reasonably be found to be the equivalent of this.
Should plaintiff be precluded if defendant has in fact sustained no
injury? Probably not. The money is still equitably the plaintiff's and
defendant cannot technically claim the position of bona fide purchaser.
to anyone else must be rather strictly scrutinized to be sure that P really meant to
be bound.
The writer has elsewhere suggested that in many instances where courts speak
of "implied authority" they are in reality speaking of real authority proved by circumstantial evidence. Likewise, not infrequently courts speak of ratification meaning
merely that subsequent events make it clear that there was real authority all along.
See Haluptzok v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 55 Minn. 446, 57 N.W. 144 (1893);
Kirkpatrick Finance Co. v. Stotts, 185 Ark. 1089, 51 S.W.2d 512 (1932); Irving
Tanning Co. v. Shir, 295 Mass. 380, 3 N.E.2d 841 (1936); Gindin v. Baron, 11
N.J. Super. 215, 78 A.2d 297 (1951).
26. Obviously, many of the cases discussed are not cases where P really wished
to ratify. However, since some of them are nominally instances of the proposition
that silence gives consent, they are lumped here for convenience as illustrations of
voluntary ratification.
27. 278 Mass. 321, 180 N.E. 148 (1932).
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However, in spite of the court's statement, one is inclined to doubt the
proposition that the defendant has sustained no injury. This seems
taking a characteristically arbitrary and unrealistic view of what
amounts to a change of position. To the present writer it seems that
anyone who receives money in the good faith belief that he is entitled
to it and, after a substantial lapse of time, is called upon to give it back,
suffers a real injury. If the defendant here were an individual of
modest means instead of a big city national bank, it is hard to doubt
that he would regard it as a cruel hardship to be asked suddenly to
produce five thousand dollars.
Affirmance by Silence and Estoppel.-The Restatement,28
writers, 2 and occasionally courts,8" have stressed the importance of
distinguishing affirmance "' by silence from estoppel. The distinction
might be of practical importance; e.g., it might affect the measure of
damages. If the unauthorized act is one which leads T to a series of
reliances (as where P's name is forged or signed without authority
to a guaranty) P as a matter of estoppel would be liable for injury
suffered by T only after P knew of the unauthorized guarantee, whereas
it might be argued that he was liable for all T's losses if his silence is
2

treated as a ratification.3

If estoppel is to be talked, plainly we must posit a duty to speak.
One cannot be responsible for the consequences of silence if one was
under no obligation to speak. If on the other hand we are talking of
"affirmance" or "assent" by silence ("Silence gives consent.") we are
28.

RESTATEMENT,

29. See

AGENCY §§ 94 and 103.

MECHEm, AGENCY

§ 349 (2d ed. 1914).

30. See Depot Realty Syndicate v. Enterprise Brewing Co., 87 Ore. 560, 170
Pac. 294, 171 Pac. 223 (1918), where defendant's agent, authorized to secure saloonkeepers who would sell defendant's beer exclusively, guaranteed, on defendant's behalf, the payment of rent by such a saloon-keeper. Defendant, being informed of
this, did nothing. Moore, J., said: "Ratification by a principal of an unauthorized
act of his agent has occasionally been grounded upon the doctrine of an equitable
estoppel. A clear distinction, however, exists between an estoppel in pais and
ratification. 'The substance of ratification is confirmation of the unauthorized act
or contract after it has been done or made, whereas the substance of estoppel is the
principal's inducement to another to act to his prejudice. Acts and conduct amounting to an estoppel in pais may in some instances amount to a ratification; but on
the other hand ratification may be complete without any elements of estoppel': 2
C. J. 469; 31 Cyc. 1247. In the case at bar, it is possible the extension of the term
of the lease and the reduction of the monthly rent might be regarded as creating an
equitable estoppel, but however that may be, we rest our decision upon an implied
ratification by the defendant of its agent's unauthorized assumption of authority, by
failing, when fully notified thereof, promptly to deny his power to consummate the
agreement."
31. "Acquiescence," "consent," "approval" and the like are words used by courts
as almost interchangeable in this context. By the Restatenwit affirmance is the manifestation of an election to treat the act as authorized (§ 83) and ratification is the
result of affirmance, whereby the act is given effect as if originally authorized

(§ 82).
32. See Note, 42 HARv. L. REv. 124 (1928).
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perhaps talking of psychology rather than duty. Silence binds the party
not because he should have spoken but because under the circumstances
the natural reaction is that his silence is tantamount to consent.
Whether or not this somewhat refined distinction is valid, the
cases talk mostly in terms of duty. A few hold that there is in general
no duty to speak and find no special factors creating such a duty.3 3
One of the best known and best reasoned cases so holding is
Myers v. Cook.3 4 There it appeared that husband and wife lived apart.
He bought logging equipment and gave a promissory note for the price,
signing her name as surety. This was done without her knowledge or
authority. The husband had never done it before nor acted as her agent
in any way. When she heard of the facts, she "grumbled" to some
extent but gave no notice to the payee of the note. The court set aside
a judgment against the wife, saying: "The htisband acted for himself
in the transaction, not the wife. He acted against her in signing her
name to a note for his debt. The plaintiff was as well aware of that
fact as he was. The former acted at his peril in taking the note without
knowledge as to whether the husband had authority to bind his wife.
He was bound to inquire and could not rely upon the supposed agent's
representation. Rosendorf v. Poling, 48 W. Va. 621; Rohrbough v.
Express Co., 50 W. Va. 155. The plaintiff omitted this duty, and,
presumptively, wronged the wife by his acceptance of the note with her
name on it. He could have ascertained by inquiry whether her signature was authorized, in time to have saved himself all she could have
saved him by her disavowal. In other words, he could have done for
himself what he thinks she should have done for him. To permit him
to make her mere failure to do that prove ratification would allow him
the benefit of his own wrong. If he had made the inquiry and she had
induced him to forego right of rescission by an express ratification or,
possibly, by silence, when required to speak, and thus caused him loss,
it would no doubt be otherwise. And, on the other hand, if she had
disavowed the act, he could have asserted his rights against the husband
at once. By rescission, he might have acquired the property he had
sold."
Also well known, though it is not easy to characterize it as well3 5 There defendant's name
reasoned, is the case of Furstv. Carrico.
was
33. See Hortons & Hutton v. Townes, Leigh 47 (Va. 1835); Kelly v. Phelps,
57 Wis. 425, 15 N.W. 385 (1883) ; Merritt v. Bissell, 155 N.Y. 396, 50 N.E. 280
(1898); Britt v. Gordon, 132 Iowa 431, 108 N.W. 319 (1906); Shinew v. First
Nat. Bank, 84 Ohio St. 297, 95 N.E. 881 (1911) ; Myers v. Cook, 87 W.Va. 265,
104 S.E. 593 (1920) ; Furst v. Carrico, 167 Md. 465, 175 Atl. 442 (1934) ; O'Neill
v. Niccolls, 324 Mass. 382, 86 N.E.2d 522 (1949).
34. 87 W.Va. 265, 104 S.E. 593 (1920).

35. 167 Md. 465, 175 AtI. 442 (1934).
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forged to a guaranty of payment, in reliance on which plaintiff sold
several bills of goods. Plaintiff notified defendant by registered mail
of the supposed guaranty and that he was selling goods in reliance
thereon, but defendant gave no answer; some of the goods were sold
after the defendant had had ample time to answer. The forger was not
defendant's agent and it is said there was no special relationship between
him and defendant which might impose a duty to speak.," Defendant's
demurrer was sustained below, and this action was affirmed. It was
significant, the court said, that the failure was to answer a letter, rather
than to respond to an oral statement, since "men use the tongue much
more readily than the pen." 17 And "the duties of strangers to transactions are duties of forbearance, not of exertion and assistance."
Other cases involving the same factual set-up as that in Furst v.
Carrico have unanimously reached a different conclusion."'
The Prevailing View.-By and large, juries have found duty and
so ratification where one who "should in good conscience speak" fails to
do so, and appellate courts have affirmed the finding. 9 Probably this
36. It appears from the facts that the purported agent was also named Carrico.
This might support an inference.
The conventional view is that a forgery cannot be ratified because, by definition,
the attempt does not satisfy the requirement that the actor purport to act as an

agent and not as a principal. Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 16 N.E. 606 (1887).
It is also said that to allow ratification would tend to stifle a criminal prosecution.
Of the latter suggestion it seems reasonable to say that the question of the effect
of a ratification on the criminal law is a rather remotely related one, which the
criminal law should be quite adequate to handle. Of the former it may be suggested that it pays more attention to form than to substance. After all, one whose
name has been forged to a document may have good reasons for electing to be bound
by the document; or he may have acted in such a way as to make it clearly inequitable
for him to deny the validity of the instrument. Either result should be attainable under the law. A number of cases frankly permit ratification: Greenfield Bank
v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447 (Mass. 1862) ; Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So.
498 (1890); Campbell v. Campbell, 133 Cal. 33, 65 Pac. 134 (1901); Hogan v.
Cooney, 51 R.I. 395, 155 Atl. 240 (1931); Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12
N.W.2d 608 (1943) ; Magid v. Drexel National Bank, 330 II1. App. 486, 71 N.E.2d
898 (1947); and more recognize the possibility that P may be "precluded" or
estopped from denying the validity of the instrument: Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio
St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 546 (1878) (no estoppel found); Casco Bank v. Keene, 53
Me. 103 (1865) ; Rudd v. Mathews, 79 Ky. 479, 42 Am. Rep. 231 (1881) ; Hefner
v. Dawson, 63 Ill. 403, 14 Am. Rep. 123 (1872); Lynch v. Richter, 10 Wash. 486,
39 Pac. 125 (1895).
As to fraudulent alteration, see Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 42 N.W. 467
(1889) ; Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. 498 (1890). And see
Greenwood v. Martin's Bank, Ltd., [1932] 1 K.B. 371, af'd, [1933] A.C. 51.
37. Cf. Traders' National Bank v. Rogers, 167 Mass. 315, 45 N.E. 923 (1897).
38. See Strauss Brothers v. Denton, 140 Miss. 745, 106 So. 257 (1925) ; Furst
& Thomas v. Smith, 280 Ky. 601, 133 S.W.2d 941 (1939).
39. In addition to cases already cited, see Argus v. Ware & Leland, 155 Iowa
583, 136 N.W. 774 (1912) ; Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co., 87
Ind. App. 179, 161 N.E. 389 (1928), noted in 42 H~Av. L. Rsv. 124 (1928); Greenwood v. Martin's Bank, Ltd., [1932] 1 K.B. 371, aff'd, [1933] A.C. 51; Watson
v. Schmidt, 173 La. 92, 136 So. 99 (1931); Renland v. First Nat. Bank, 90 Mont.
424, 4 P.2d 488 (1931); Continental Supply Co. v. Palmer, 19 La. App. 718, 140
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does not involve disagreement with the reasoning of Myers v. Cook,
supra, so much as it reflects a difference in setting. The Myers case
is uncommon in that the factors seeming to call for repudiation were
at a minimum. Where the actor is known to be the principal's agent
or has often acted as such,4 ° or where the geographical or other relationship between the parties makes repudiation easy, it is hard to persuade courts that there is no duty to speak. The doctrine of the Myers
case posits an actor who is nearly a pure interloper; such instances are
rare
INVOLUNTARY RATIFICATION

As has already been pointed out, the generality of cases to which
the tag "ratification" is applied are not cases where the principal with
full knowledge of the consequences, deliberately elects to ratify; they are
cases where the principal has not the least wish to ratify but where he
has put himself (or chosen to remain) in a situation where he cannot
equitably refuse to treat the contract as ratified.
To such cases the name "involuntary ratification" has herein been
given and the following discussion will be devoted to an analysis of
the problem and an attempt to classify the cases.
If the contract is wholly executory, the only likely basis for holding
P will be that he has ratified by silence or has estopped himself from
denying ratification. (The latter, obviously, is a case of involuntary
ratification but for reasons given above it has been lumped with ratification by silence, commonly assumed to be a form of voluntary ratification.) On the other hand, since we mean by "the contract" the unauthorized contract or, as is more likely, the authorized contract with
unauthorized terms, if the contract is completely executed that will mean
that P has performed, although not bound so to do, and hence will
normally neither wish to nor be in a position to object to the unauthorSo. 81 (1932) ; Sullivan v. Bennett, 261 Mich. 232, 246 N.W. 90 (1933); McNeely

v. Walters, 211 N.C. 112, 189 S.E. 114 (1937);

Gordon Construction Co. v.

Pettingill, 105 Colo. 214, 96 P.2d 416 (1939) ; Moe v. Zitek, 75 N.D. 222, 27 N.W.2d

10 (1947).
40. "A distinction has been made between the acts of an agent who has gone
beyond his authority, and those of a mere stranger intermeddling in affairs with
which he is in no way concerned. In the case of a stranger, it has been said that the
act will not be binding upon the principal unless expressly ratified by him. Ward
v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447. But the better opinion appears to be, that in this, as in
the case where an agency exists, the approval of the principal may be inferred from
his silence and acquiescence when informed of what has been done in his name. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R Co. v. Cowell, 28 Penn St., 329; Ladd v.
Heilderbrant, 27 Wis. 135. But all agree that the relations of the parties are of great
consequence in determining the question of ratification, the presumption arising from

acquiescence being very much stronger where the agency exists than in the case
of a mere stranger.

Story on Agency, § 256."

Hallett, C. J., in Union Gold Mining

Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 248 (1873).
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ized contract or the unauthorized portion of it. Hence the problem will
chiefly arise where the contract is partly executed, the unexecuted portion naturally being the performance by P, promised by A but without
authority.
A Matter of Election.-In such a case the position of P will
be, basically, very much like that of a defrauded person. True, the
third party is not assumed to have done any deliberate wrong but,
ex hypothesi, he has chosen to deal with an agent who had neither real
nor apparent authority, and hence he has no rights on which he can
stand. It is perhaps fair to say that his position, legally, is no better
than that of a contracting party guilty of fraud.
The injured party, in a fraud case, normally has an election. He
is not compelled to repudiate the transaction; he may affirm it and
(what is not pertinent to the present analogy) sue for damages. On
the other hand he may if he chooses disaffirm; in such a case he is entitled to the return of any performance rendered on the assumption that
the contract was valid and would stand, and must normally himself return any performance received under the contract. The latter requirement is plainly based on principles of unjust enrichment: if he were
allowed to terminate the contract and receive back what he has given,
and at the same time to keep what he had received, he would be unjustly
enriched to the extent of the benefit retained.
It is to be remembered that in the ratification case just as in the
fraud case, there is only one contract involved: that actually made between T and A. 4 Since it was in whole or in part unauthorized, P
need not be bound by it. If he elects to affirm, however, he can only
affirm the contract as made; he cannot affirm, i.e., enforce, the authorized part, and not affirm the unauthorized part. To do so would be
forcing on T a contract he never made.
It follows, thus, that in the typical case of the partly-executed
contract, the P has two choices and two only. He may disaffirm, in
which case he must return what he has received. Or he may affirm,
in which case he necessarily ratifies the unauthorized part of the contract. In the latter case the typical result is to bind him to perform the
unauthorized part of the contract, which he had hoped to repudiate,
although retaining the benefit of the third party's performance.
In the fraud cases the election to affirm (and, in both the fraud and
the ratification cases, it is the election to affirm which is more decisive
41. Rarely the case is presented where A has made several authorized contracts
at the same time or where, although there is nominally only one contract, it is
clearly and fairly severable. In such a case one of the contracts, or a severable part,
may be ratified. See Meeks v. Adams Louisiana Co., 49 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ga.
1943).
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and more vital) is commonly made in one of two ways: (a) by affirmance in pais and (b) by affirmance by suit.4 The same is commonly
true of election to ratify.
Affirmance in Paris.-By this is simply meant conduct inconsistent with the obligation of the party to disaffirm, if he ever means
to do so, promptly on his discovery of his right to elect. Plainly
rescission is more drastic and more upsetting to the other party than
affirmance (and this is particularly true in the ratification cases since
there, as distinguished from the fraud case, the ratification imposes
no burden but on the contrary leaves the other party in the situation
he has all along assumed he was entitled to be in) and plainly each day
during which the dominant party fails to make his choice to rescind
adds to the actual or possible hardship to the other party. Hence
courts are rather quick to find that P's failure either to return what he
has received or to demand a rescission, justifies treating him as having
affirmed.
So where the agent of a lumber company without authority contracted to buy standing timber and the lumber company contracted to
sell it to a third party in the form of lumber, had part of it milled and
delivered to the third party, it was held too late for the company to
insist that the contract of purchase was unauthorized.4
And so where the manager of plaintiff's racing stable sold a race
horse without authority, and some months later, after the horse in the
hands of its new owner had won several races, plaintiff challenged the
sale as unauthorized and demanded a return of the horse (but without
44
tendering a return of the price) it was held that he had ratified.
And so where plaintiff corporation's agent, authorized to rent
property but not for more than two years, leased it to defendant for
four years, the lease being put in plaintiff's safe although plaintiff never
bothered to examine it, and plaintiff accepted rent from defendant for
nearly two years, it was held that plaintiff must be charged with having
ratified and could not eject defendant at the termination of two years.45
Land Contracts Induced by Unauthorized Misrepresentations.
-As a real estate broker is only authorized to find a possible buyer,
with whom the principal then negotiates, it is assumed that statements
as to the character and attributes of the land will be made by the prin42. There can, of course, be an express affirmance just as there can be an express ratification, but this is not pertinent in the present context.

43. Wilkins v. Waldo Lumber Co., 130 Me. 5, 153 At. 191 (1931).
44. Watson v. Schmidt, 173 La. 92, 136 So. 99 (1931).

45. Payne Realty Co. v. Lindsey, 91 W.Va. 127, 112 S.E. 306 (1922).

See also

Sargent v. Drew-English, Inc., 12 Wash.2d 320, 121 P.2d 373 (1942); Marian v.
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 149 Pa. Super. 653, 27 A.2d 549 (1942); Cannon v.
Blake, 353 Mo. 294, 182 S.W.2d 303 (1944).
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cipal in person while negotiating. It follows that the incidental or
apparent authority of the broker to make representations is very limited
and scarcely goes beyond identifying the land. Where the broker has
thus no power to bind the principal by his representations, it follows
that the principal cannot be held liable for them in tort. A majority of
cases however (and the Restatement)

46

to prevent unjust enrichment

of the principal, allow the third party to rescind in such a case.
Suppose that the third party, on discovering that he has been deceived, demands a rescission from the principal; the principal refuses
and says that he stands on the contract. Will this have the effect of
ratifying the representations so as to make the principal liable in tort?
An affirmative answer might be expected. In other situations
courts are quick to say that a principal cannot retain the benefits of a
transaction and at the same time disavow the means by which the
benefits have been obtained. A little authority applies this view here.
Thus in Light v. Chandler Improvement Company,4 7 the court says
that the buyer, on discovering the fraud, may go to the seller and offer
to rescind. "If the owner, after due notice of the fraud and offer of
rescission, insists upon holding the purchaser to his bargain, he will
then be deemed to have ratified the alleged representations of the agent
and the purchaser may pursue as against such owner and remedy
which he would have had, had the false representations been made by
the owner in person." 4s
In most instances, however, it seems to be assumed that the purchaser is adequately protected by his right to rescind and that the
seller's unwillingness to rescind will not be treated as an affirmance.
It is not quite clear what is the basis of this attitude. Perhaps it is
thought that in such a case since the sale itself is as authorized (i.e.,
the agent was unquestionably authorized to find a buyer) and the
principal has performed all promises made on his behalf, that the principal is not keeping anything to which he is not entitled by the contract. Such an argument is plainly fallacious, however, particularly
where the loss of bargain theory of damages is applied, since his liability is the same as if he had promised to sell a property of the type
represented, which he plainly has not done. In substance the case
seems to be like one involving an unauthorized warranty, where retention or attempt to enforce will normally be treated as ratification. Perhaps, in view of the traditional reluctance of courts to hold an innocent
principal for fraud, it can be said that they are simply expressing a
46. RFSTATEMENT, AGENCY § 259.
47. 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac. 969 (1928).
48. And see Lewis v. McClure, 127 Cal. App. 9, 15 P.2d 166 (1932); Daum v.
Urqhart, 61 S.D. 431, 249 N.W. 738 (1933); Gower v. Wieser, 269 Mich. 6, 256
N.W. 603 (1934); Smith v. Miller, 225 Iowa 241, 280 N.W. 493 (1938).
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feeling that the third party should have known better and is given all
the protection he deserves by being given a right to rescind.
Restitutionary Relief Based on Receipt of Benefits.-In a
number of cases a principal who has received money as the result of the
unauthorized act of. his agent, is held liable to T in an action of assumpsit for money had and received. In such cases it is seldom said
that the defendant's liability rests on a theory of ratification. It is
apparent, nevertheless, that the basis of the liability is the same as
would exist in slightly different circumstances where it would be said
that defendant had ratified. The retention of benefits, that is, is the
basic operative fact charging defendant with liability; what form, technically, the relief takes is relatively immaterial.
A typical instance is afforded by the case of FirstNational Bank
v. Oberne,4 9 where defendant, a Chicago firm dealing in hides and
pelts, had an agent in Las Vegas who was authorized to draw checks,
for their business, on their account in plaintiff, a Las Vegas bank.
The agent received a note from J. S., for a personal debt; he indorsed
and guaranteed payment of the note in defendant's name, discounted
it with the bank, and put the proceeds into defendant's account. Thereafter he withdrew the money on various checks, two of which, amounting to $560.27, were given in payment for pelts bought for defendant
and which, apparently, were shipped to them and used by them in the
ordinary course of their business. The guaranty of the note was conceded to be outside the authority of the agent, but defendant was held
liable to the extent of $560.27, namely the extent to which they received
the proceeds of the unauthorized act. The court said that they could
not "be permitted to repudiate a contract made in their name by an
assumed agent, on the ground of a want of authority in the ajent to
make it, without restoring the money received by them under the contract, and as the result of an agent's act." 1o
It is clear that in such a case this is more realistic than to speak
of ratification. Defendants have neither prospectively nor retrospectively approved the conduct of their agent; this is, however, money (in
the form of pelts) received by their agent, ostensibly on their behalf,
and if they elect to keep it, it can be argued that they are as much
obligated to account for it as if it had been in fact received on their
account.
The question might be asked: suppose defendant's account with
the bank was overdrawn because of improper drafts on it made by the
49. 121 Ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886).
50. See also Seifert v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 191 Minn. 362, 254
N.W. 273 (1934); Duffy v. Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273 (1940).
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A, so that the pelts in fact represented payment by A to P for prior
improper transactions-could it then be argued that the value was received in payment of an antecedent debt, making defendant a bona fide
purchaser for value? It could be asked: is defendant barred from
asserting such a claim by virtue of the knowledge of the agent who was
the active party? These and other questions involving restitution,
bona fide purchase, and the like, can only be suggested here, and a few
typical cases cited."' Any more detailed discussion must be sought in
works on Equity and Restitution.
Affirmance by Suit.-As already pointed out, there is in these
cases only one contract: the contract as made by the agent. It is
not possible to sue on part of a contract. Hence, a suit brought by the
principal on the contract can only be taken as a suit brought on all the
contract; it is necessarily brought on the (hitherto) unauthorized portion as well as on the authorized portion. This, it should be stressed,
is not the same as saying that P has evinced his wish to affirm. Quite
the contrary. No doubt in most instances he is either deliberately
taking a chance or acting in ignorance of probable consequences. A
party with an election must make it sooner or later; sooner, in fairness
to the other party. And when he has taken an unequivocal step which
is only consistent with an affirmance it is difficult to say that he can
escape the consequences by showing that he did not intend them.
The party who has affirmed by bringing suit may have had only
the alternative of suing or not suing, or he may have had a choice of
several remedies, one or more of which would not necessarily have been
an affirmance.
In a Minnesota case the agent of plaintiff corporation had sold T
shares-of plaintiff's stock, taking his note therefor, and promising that
plaintiff would employ him as local representative, and furnish him
with a place of business and equipment; the latter part of the agreement was unauthorized. Without furnishing the place of business or
equipment (although a certificate of stock had been given) plaintiff
sued T on the note. It was held that the effect was to ratify the unauthorized portion of the contract; plaintiff was then necessarily in
default, having neither given the promised consideration nor evinced
any readiness and willingness to do so. 2
51. See Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291 (1873); Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N.Y.
199 (1872) ; Bailey v. Hamburg, 106 Wash. 177, 179 Pac. 88 (1919) ; Arkansas Valley
Bank v. Kelley, 176 Ark. 387, 3 S.W.2d 53 (1928) ; Citizens Banldng Co. v. American Bakeries Co., 41 Ga. App. 89, 151 S.E. 824 (1930); Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Co. v. Pittsburg Pipe & Supply Co., 135 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939); Blumberg v. Taggard, 213 Minn. 39, 5 N.W.2d 388 (1942); Newco Land
Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99, 213 S.W.2d 504 (1948).
52. Independent Harvester Co. v. Malzohn, 147 Minn. 145, 179 N.W. 727 (1920).
Cf. Robie v. Holdahl, 180 Minn. 226, 230 N.W. 641 (1930), where a corporation
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In a well known Connecticut case " plaintiff was a dealer in
musical instruments; his agent sold and delivered a piano to defendant,
the latter to pay for the same by cancelling certain brokerage debts
which the agent owed or expected to owe him. Such a sale was of
course unauthorized; when plaintiff discovered the sale he repudiated
it and brought an action of assumpsit to recover the price of the piano.
The court said that they could have recovered the piano in replevin or
its value in trover. "But, knowing the terms of the sale, they elected
to sue in assumpsit on the contract for the agreed price, and thereby
they affirmed the contract and ratified the act of the agent, precisely as
if it had been expressly approved upon being reported to them by the
agent or the defendant.

.

. . The argument for the plaintiff (though

it is not so stated) seems really to involve the fallacious assumption
that the plaintiffs could affirm the contract in part and repudiate it in
part; that is, that the contract is to be treated as good for the agreed
price but bad as to the agreed mode of payment. But the law requires
a contract to be affirmed or repudiated in its entirety. There was no
contract at all relative to the piano except the one made by Day as
their agent; and when the plaintiffs, knowing the facts, sued on that
contract, they affirmed it in every essential particular, both as to price
and as to the terms of paying the price."
Of the two cases just stated the first at least seems to reach an
eminently satisfactory result. Plaintiff's attempt to enforce the contract without the authorized term failed. In effect the result was a
rescission, leaving the parties where they should be, unless plaintiff
were willing to be bound by the contract as made by their agent. The
result of the second is more questionable. It leaves defendant with a
piano to which, as against plaintiff, he had no claim; plaintiff is out a
piano, not from any attempt to be grasping or to force on defendant a
made a deed of its property to plaintiff as trustee for its creditors, and plaintiff
liquidated the assets and applied them pro rata among the creditors. Thereafter
he was appointed receiver and brought an action to enforce the stockholders' statutory liability. Defense, that one Lacy, who had negotiated the deed of trust, had
secured it on the agreement that the creditors would waive the stockholders' liability. Held, no ratification. "The evidence discloses no other benefit to the creditors of the company except a part payment of their debts, something they were
legally entitled to receive and retain irrespective of any contract."
See generally Eadie, Guilford & Co. v. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa 519 (1876);
Kelley v. Isensee, 60 N.D. 149, 233 N.W. 245 (1930); General Paint Corp. v.
Kramer, 57 F.2d 698 (1932); Crookum v. Ketchum, 174 Okla. 468, 50 P.2d 710
(1935) ; Tway v. Southern Methodist Hospital, 48 Ariz. 490, 62 P.2d 1318 (1936) ;
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co v. Smith, 130 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
King v. Continental Casualty Co., 110 F.2d 950 (1940); Walter v. Baldwin, 126
Pa. Super. 589, 193 Atl. 146 (1937); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lieberman,
39 F. Supp. 243 (D. N.J. 1941); Halsey v. Robinson, 19 Cal.2d 476, 122 P.2d 11
(1942); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 720, 132 P.2d

70 (1943).
53. Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, 17 Atl. 278 (1889).
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contract he never made, but solely because of a mistake of law as to
the proper form of relief to be invoked. Perhaps plaintiff should be
allowed to dismiss and start again, or to amend. However, where the
action is brought with knowledge of the facts 54 it is hard to say how
far the court should go in allowing a plaintiff,to change his ground
because of his own mistake as to the merits of the course of action he
has deliberately chosen. 55
54. A later hearing in the case, 59 Conn. 588, 22 Atl. 437 (1890), suggests that
P may not really have known what contract he was ratifying.
55. The doctrine of the Shoninger case appears to be approved by the Restatement. See § 97, Illustration 1. It may be suggested that in the fraud cases the
party presumably gets something of value, whichever alternative he elects; here he
just elected himself out of his piano.
Instructive to contrast with the Shoninger case is United' Australia, Ltd. v.
Barclays Bank, [1941] A. C. 1, [1940] 4 All. E.R. 20. "E. was the secretary and
a director of the plaintiff company. Without authority, he indorsed a cheque, made
payable to his company, to M. F. G. Trust, Ltd. The defendant bank accepted it
for collection, and credited the proceeds to the account of M. F. G. Trust, Ltd. Subsequently, the plaintiff company commenced an action against M. F. G. Trust, Ltd.,
to recover the value of the cheque as a loan, or, in the alternative, as money had and
received. Before final judgment, M. F. G. Trust, Ltd., went into liquidation. The
plaintiffs put in a proof for the sum alleged to be due in the liquidation, but the proof
was not admitted, as the funds to meet the demands of creditors were merely trivial.
They then brought the present action against the bank for wrongful conversion of
the cheque. The defence pleaded was, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had ratified
E.'s indorsement of the cheque by suing the M. F. G. Trust, Ltd., and had, therefore,
waived the tort." This defense was successful below, but was denied by the House
of Lords, which held that there was no election or ratification. Lord Atkin said: "I
will deal with election later, but at present I wish to deal with the waiver of the
tort which is said to arise whenever the injured person sues in contract for money
received. If the plaintiff in truith treats the wrongdoer as having acted as his agent,
overlooks the wrong, and, by consent of both parties, is content to receive the proceeds, this will be a true waiver. It will arise necessarily where the plaintiff ratifies,
in the true sense, an unauthorised act of an agent. In that case, the lack of authority
disappears, and the correct view is, not that the tort is waived, but that by retraction of the ratification it has never existed. In the ordinary case, however, the plaintiff has never the slightest intention of waiving, excusing, or in any kind of way
palliating the tort. If I find that a thief has stolen my securities and is in possession
of the proceeds, when I sue him for them, I am not excusing him. I am protesting
violently that he is a thief, and, because of his theft, I am suing him." . . . "Concurrently with the decisions as to waiver of tort, there is to be found a supposed
application of election, and the allegation is sometimes to be found that the plaintiff
elected to waive the tort. It seems to me that in this respect it is essential to bear
in mind the distinction between choosing one of two alternative remedies and choosing
one of two inconsistent rights. As far as remedies were concerned, from the oldest
time the only restriction was on the choice between real and personal actions. If you
chose the one, you could not claim on the other. Real actions have long disappeared,
and, subject to the difficulty of including two causes of action in one writ, which
has also now disappeared, there has not been, and there certainly is not now, any
compulsion to choose between alternative remedies. You may put them in the same
writ, or you may put one in first and then amend and add or substitute another."
"On the other hand, if a man is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights, it is
fitting that, when, with full knowledge, he has done an unequivocal act showing that
he has chosen the one, he cannot afterwards pursue the other, which, after the first
choice, is by reason of the inconsistency, no longer his to choose. Instances are the
right of a principal dealing with an agent for an undisclosed principal to choose
the liability of the agent or the principal, the right of a landlord whose forfeiture of
a lease has been committed to exact the forfeiture or to treat the former tenant as
still tenant, and the like." . . . "I think, therefore, that, on a question of alternative
remedies, no question of election arises until one or the other claim has been brought
to judgment." . . . "Verschures Creameries v. Hull & Netherlands S. S. Co. [1921]
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Change of Position. The election angle of ratification has been
stressed because of its usefulness in explaining certain cases otherwise
hard, if not impossible, to explain. These involve the matter of change
of position. A person wishing to rescind normally must restore what
he has received. This is obviously because of the unjust enrichment
that would otherwise accrue to the rescinding party. However, there
may be cases in which forcing him to restore would in fact unjustly
enrich the other party. In such a case P should be able to rescind,
i.e., repudiate the unauthorized agreement or portion thereof, without
restoration.
Among other instances given in § 99 of the Restatement, is this:
"4. Purporting to represent P but without power to bind him thereby,
A contracts with T to deliver to P a case of grapefruit. P, supposing
that the grapefruit came as a gift from a friend in Florida, eats some of
them and the rest are destroyed in a fire before he learns the facts.
There is no affirmance."
Plainly in such a case to make P pay would be to unjustly impoverish P. He has in fact received no substantial benefit from the
grapefruit. And T would be unjustly enriched by escaping a loss
resulting from his own carelessness and which, as between him and
P, T should bear.
A not uncommon case involves the agent of a corporation who
travels selling its stock. He is likely to be carrying blank certificates
which he is authorized to fill in and deliver. In such a situation an
unscrupulous agent, dealing with a housewife or other possible purchaser little familiar with business practices, is likely to clinch the
sale by making the obviously " quite unauthorized promise that at
the end of a period the company will on request repurchase the stock
at a named price, usually its par value or even more. The salesman
thereby earns a commission and expects to be on another job in another
part of the country before the named time elapses and the company
discovers what has been done.
Practically all possible solutions may be found in the cases dealing
with such a practice. The principal may be held on a theory of ap2 K.B. 608, upon which both the courts below founded their decision, has, with great
respect, very little bearing on the matter. A firm of carriers, being authorised by
the plaintiffs to carry goods to A, delivered them to B. The plaintiffs invoiced the
goods to B, sued him for the price, recovered judgment, and took bankruptcy proceedings against him. They afterwards sued the carriers for misdelivery. It was
the plainest case of ratification of an act done by the carriers purporting to deliver
on behalf of the plaintiffs, and, as such, there could be no complaint against the carriers for breach of authority."
56. Obvious, that is, to a lawyer or business man, but not likely to be so to the
unsuspecting victim.
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parent authority 17 or of ratification; 58 the principal may be held on a
quasi-contractual theory; " the principal may not be held on any
theory.60 The last solution seems most readily justified on a change
of position theory. The matter will not come to light for a period of
years after the sale. The company will long since have spent the
money. The purchaser naturally will not be seeking to enforce the
agreement unless the stock is now worth less than the promised price.
The election presented-between rescission and affirmance is now purely
nominal, since either way the company will have to pay out for the stock
more than its value. In the light of these circumstances it seems that
the purchaser has no compelling equity against the company. Rescission is normally assumed to mean no loss to either party, but here one
party or the other has to take the loss in value and it seems fair to put it
on the one who allowed himself to be tricked by the agent.
The case of Johnson v. City Company " affords a striking instance
of change of position in a situation analogous to those just discussed.
In November of 1929 defendant's agent sold plaintiff certain stock for
$450 a share, warranting that its market value would be $650 'a share
within three days. The warranty was fantastic, except perhaps in the
hysteria of the moment; it was plainly unauthorized. Three days later
the value of the stock had gone, not up but down, two hundred dollars
a share. Plaintiff sued for his loss, alleging among other things, that
defendant could not retain the benefits of the transaction and at the
same time repudiate the authority of the agent to make it. Such a
doctrine, the court replied, does not apply where the principal has
changed his position before learning of the agent's unauthorized act.
57. See Wright v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 223 Iowa 1192, 274 N.W. 892

(1938).

58. See Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 28 Pac. 267
(1930).
59. In Seifert v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 191 Minn. 362, 254 N.W. 273
(1934), the purchaser was allowed to recover the purchase price back in a quasicontractual action. The court said: "The findings establish that Mr. Michel had no
authority to bind defendant by offer of monthly bonus or to repurchase. But, nevertheless, that agreement was both term and condition of the supposed contract under
which plaintiff parted with his money. Defendant cannot affirm in part and repudiate
in part. Failure of the agreement to bind defendant according to its terms makes
a clear case of no contract. Plaintiff did not get what he paid for; there was failure
of consideration for his payment, and so he is entitled to recover it in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendant which otherwise would result. One of the
long recognized heads of such recovery is 'where the money was paid under a mistake
as to the creation, existence, or extent of an obligation.' Keener, Quasi-Contracts,
112. This is just such a case."
See also Plate v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 229 Mich. 482, 201 N.W.

457 (1924); Downs v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 348, 174
Atl. 887 (1934).
60. See Schuster v. North American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 184 N.W. 136,
186 N.W. 87 (1921).
61. 78 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1935).

19521

THE RATIONALE OF RATIFICATION

To be contrasted with this is the famous case of Wheeler v. the
Northwestern Sleigh Company.6 2 P's agent, authorized to sell P's
stock, did so but, without authority, threw in gratis a dividend already
declared on the stock and so not normally passing with a sale of the
stock. P was allowed to enforce the sale of the stock without the dividend, making T pay for the stock alone the price he had agreed to give
for the stock and the dividend. No facts appear which would warrant
a justification of the decision in terms of change of position. Less than
three months elapsed between the sale and P's discovery of the unauthorized term. It is not suggested that the value of the stock had
changed significantly; indeed there is no suggestion that it had changed
at all. This decision and some others like it, appear to overlook the
fundamental equities of the problem, and it is believed that they must be
treated as unsound.
RATIFICATION AGAINST AN UNWILLING THIRD PARTY

The case sometimes, though infrequently, arises, where a principal,
finding out about the unauthorized contract and thinking it a profitable
one, wishes to ratify, but the third party (perhaps for the same reason
that the principal wishes to ratify) repudiates the contract and insists
he is not bound. Can the principal effectively ratify in such a case?
The few cases on this point illustrate three different views.
The English View. The English cases have applied the maxim
omnis ratihabitiowith strict logic. 3 Since the effect of the ratification
is to treat the contract as if it had been authorized in the first place,
and since the third party was plainly willing to be bound by the contract
at the time it is made, it follows automatically that once the contract is
62. 39 Fed. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1889).
63. In Bolton Partners v. Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295 (1889), plaintiff's manager,
Scratchley, without authority leased defendant property belonging to plaintiff.
Later, defendant attempted to withdraw from the contract; thereafter plaintiff rati-

fied.

Specific performance was granted. Lopes, L. J., said: "If there had been no

withdrawal of the offer, this case would have been simple. The ratification by the
plaintiffs would have related back to the time of the acceptance of the defendant's
offer by Scratchley, and the plaintiffs would have adopted a contract made on their
behalf.

"It is said that there was no contract which could be ratified, because Scratchley
at the time he accepted the defendant's offer had no authority to act for the plaintiffs. Directly Scratchley on behalf and in the name of the plaintiffs accepted the
defendant's offer, I think there was a contract made by Scratchley assuming to act
for the plaintiffs, subject to proof by the plaintiffs that Scratchley had that authority.
"The plaintiffs subsequently did adopt the contract, and thereby recognized the

authority of their agent Scratchley. Directly they did so the doctrine of ratification
applied and gave the same effect to the contract made by Scratchley as it would have
had if Scratchley had been clothed with a precedent authority to make it.
"If Scratchley had acted under a precedent authority the withdrawal of the
offer by the defendant would have been inoperative, and it is equally inoperative
where the plaintiffs have ratified and adopted the contract of the agent. To hold
otherwise would be to deprive the doctrine of ratification of its retrospective effect."
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ratified, the third party-must be treated as being as much bound as if
there had been authority originally. This seems reasonable and, unless
a long time has elapsed (and the later English cases say that P must
ratify within a reasonable time 64), there seems no great hardship on the
third party.
American courts have been slow to follow this view, however, and
it has been rigorously criticized by writers. Thus Mr. Seavey says
that the effect "is to worship the fiction of relation back as a transcendental shrine and justifies the harshest language used by the critics of
the doctrine. It creates an offer when none was intended and imposes
upon the mistaken party an obligation not imposed upon an offeror.
The English court creates before ratification a contract subject to disaffirmance, a one-sided obligation created elsewhere only where it has
been paid for, where protection is afforded to a dependent class, or
where there is fraud." 65
The Wisconsin View. The extreme opposite view has been taken
by some early Wisconsin cases, supposed still to be law. In Dodge v.
Hopkins,"' where the principal sought to enforce a land contract made
by an agent whose power of attorney, the court found, did not authorize
the sale in question, the court said that if (at the time the purported
contract is made) "either party neglects or refuses to bind himself, the
instrument is void for want of mutuality, and the party who is not
bound cannot avail himself of it as obligatory on the other." Furthermore "no subsequent act of the party, who has neglected to execute
it can render it obligatory on the party who did execute it without his
assent.

.

. . The principal in such case may, by his subsequent assent,

bind himself; but if the contract be executory, he cannot bind the other
party. The latter may, if he choose, avail himself of such assent against
the principal which, if he does, the contract, by virtue of such mutual
ratification, becomes mutually obligatory." 67
On this view the principal's attempted ratification amounts virtually
only to an offer, which the third party may accept or not as he chooses.
Under it ratification becomes a one-sided proposition by which a principal may bind himself but not the other party. If the English view
seems to carry Agency doctrines to their logical extreme at the expense
of contract concepts, it may be said that the Wisconsin view carries
Contract doctrines to their logical extreme at the expense of Agency
64. See In re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines, 45 Ch. D. 16 (1890).
65. Seavey, The Rationale of AgenCy, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 891 (1920); SEAVEY,
STUDIES IN AGENCY 104 (1949).
66. 14 Wis. 630 (1861).
67. See also- Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43 (1887). A note in [1947]
Wis. L. REv. 394 remarks: "This unique view has not been repudiated by any later
Wisconsin decision. But neither has it been reiterated in recent years."
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Of course the Wisconsin view could be justified as taking

the blunt and realistic view that there really is no such doctrine as
ratification; there are only cases where equitable considerations preclude
someone, usually the principal, from relying on the agent's lack of authority. No strong equitable considerations appear to require that an
unwilling third party be held bound where the principal originally was
not; hence there is no occasion for lumping this situation with others
really unlike it, and invoking the name "ratification." As already
appears the present writer would find little difficulty in agreeing with
this. However, if we are to continue to assume that the maxim omnis
ratihabitioand so on really expresses something in the nature of a rule
of law it is hard to think of the Wisconsin cases as anything but
deviations.
The "Prevailing" View. In as far as the few American cases
permit speaking of a majority rule, it would seem to be a compromise
between the English and the Wisconsin doctrines. The principal may
ratify if he does so before the third party withdraws from the contract."8
On this view the original purported contract is in substance an offer
by T to P; like any other offer it may be accepted before, and only
before, withdrawal.
This view is thus expressed in § 88 of the Restatement: "To constitute ratification, the affirmance of a transaction must be before the
third party has manifested his withdrawal from it either to the purported
principal or to the agent, and before the offer or agreement has otherwise terminated or been discharged."
As is often the case with compromises, this position seems to have
no particular logic to recommend it. Either the English or the Wisconsin view appears more logical. However, as a matter of policy and
psychology, it eliminates the lack of mutuality characteristic of the
English view and at the same time does not completely repudiate the
doctrine of ratification nor prevent the principal in most instances from
taking advantage of it. 9
Suppose insurance on the principal's property to be effected by one
purporting to be but not in fact authorized to do so. May the principal,
after loss has occurred, ratify so as to collect the insurance? Under the
English rule as to ratification against an unwilling third party, the
68. See McClintock v. South Penn Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, 23 AtI. 211 (1892)7Baldwin v. Schiappacasse, 109 Mich. 170, 66 N.W. 1091 (1896) ; Steinfeld v. Broxholme, 59 Cal. App. 623, 211 Pac. 473 (1922); Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199
S.C. 5, 18 S.E.2d 584 (1942); Equity Mutual Insurance Co. v. General Casualty
Co., 139 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1943).
69. See, generally, F.R. Mechem, A Question of Ratification, 24 AM. L.
REv. 580 (1890); Wambaugh, A Problem as to Ratification, 9 HmaV. L. Rxv.

60 (1895).
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insurance company's objection is no defense, and a line of cases, mostly
dealing with marine insurance, have settled it that the principal may
ratify after loss."0 Conversely, under the Wisconsin view, there could
be no ratification unless the company was willing, which it would
scarcely be likely to be.
Under the prevailing American view there could be no ratification
if the company learned of the lack of authority and withdrew before
the principal ratified, but if the principal attempts to ratify before the
company withdraws the weight of the scant authority is that he may."
One striking consequence is that this permits the principal to do
by ratification what he could not do directly, namely, insure lost property.7" The result, however, is not as anomalous or as hard on the
insurance company as it might seem to be at first sight. The premium
will have been paid (or must be accounted for); the transaction, from
the standpoint of the insurance company, will be completely routine and
will present none of the apparent hardship there is in the case of an
individual third party forced to pay a claim that might have been
averted had the agent's lack of authority been known.78
The Restatement does not subscribe to this view. By § 89 ratification is not effective, at the third party's election, "if it occurs after the
situation has so materially changed that it would be inequitable to subject him to liability thereon." 7' Comment c. indicates that this is
70. See Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M. & S. 485 (1814); Williams v. North
China Insurance Co., 1 C.P.D. 757 (1876); Grover and Grover, Ltd. v. Mathews
[1910] 2 K.B. 401.

71. See Watson v. Southern Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 31 So. 904 (Miss. 1902);
Bontwell v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 193 N.Y. 323, 85 N.E. 1087 (1908);
Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 198 Fed. 475, 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
229 U.S. 621 (1912); Farrar v. Western Assurance Co., 30 Cal. App. 489,
159 Pac. 609 (1916); Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society v. Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp., 50 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1931), noted in 32 CoT. L. REv. 139 (1932).
Cf. Kline Bros. & Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 192 Fed. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), noted
in 25 HARV. L. REv. 729 (1911) (opinion by L. Hand, J.).
See, generally, Robinson, Ratification After Loss in Fire Inmtraiwe, 18 CoRN.
L.Q. 161 (1933).
72. See Mallard v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minn., 216 S.W.2d 263
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
73. In the Marqusee case, supra note 71, it is said: "Before ratification an unauthorized contract is not binding, because it is not mutual. The party discovering
the lack of authority may therefore withdraw. When he has done so there is
nothing to ratify. What shocks us at first blush is that one may ratify an unauthorized contract after he knows that it is to his own advantage to do so, and so
bind the other party to his apparent disadvantage. Further reflection, however,
causes this apparent unfairness to disappear. The other party, having agreed to be
bound by this contract and not having withdrawn from it, has no ground to complain if compelled to perform; the original lack of authority having been cured."
74. See Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332 (U.S. 1874); Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio
St. 514 (1877); Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. 12, 16 S.W. 639 (1891); Norton
v. Ala. Nat. Bank, 102 Ala. 420, 14 So. 892 (1893); Graham v. Williams, 114 Ga.
716, 40 S.E. 790 (1902); People ex rel. Goldschmidt v. Board of Education, 217
N.Y. 470,.112 N.E. 167 (1916) ; Taslich v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 33, 262
Pac. 281 (1927), noted in 41 HARv. L. Ray. 792 (1937) ; Forrest v. Hawkins, 169
Va. 470, 194 S.E. 721 (1938) ; Pape v. Home Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
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thought to be true in the insurance cases, unless the consideration has
been paid before loss. Query, whether this factor has much to do with
the fairness of the matter, since the principal will naturally have to pay
or account before receiving the insurance.
CONCLUSION

Latin phrases, once learned, are hard to forget. Lawyers who
could not ask the way or order a drink in Rome, still talk learnedly of
vi et armis and administrators cum testamento annexo de bonis non. It
would not be difficult to treat most of the matters herein discussed, as
simply a part of the law of authority, apparent authority, and agency
powers (with bits of straight and quasi Contracts tossed in). And,
it is suggested, it would be much, much- better to do so than to keep
on asserting that a ratification is equipollent to a prior mandate.

